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IntRodUctIon
Today, an ever-growing number of sensitive 
transactions of data take place on-line (e.g., e-
government, internet banking and e-commerce), 
and cyber crime has become prevalent. One of 
the consequences of this is that the cybersecurity 
of information systems has become an increas-
ing concern. Assessing the level of risk posed 
by specific events is an area of ongoing interest 
for most (if not all) organisations, leading to a 
requirement for scientific methods of validating 
the cybersecurity of software systems.
towards a more Systematic 
Approach to Secure Systems 
design and Analysis
Simon Miller, Intelligent Modelling and Analysis Research Group, School of Computer 
Science, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Susan Appleby, Communications-Electronics Security Group, Cheltenham, 
Gloucestershire, UK
Jonathan M. Garibaldi, Intelligent Modelling and Analysis Research Group, School of 
Computer Science, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Uwe Aickelin, Intelligent Modelling and Analysis Research Group, School of Computer 
Science, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
ABStRAct
The task of designing secure software systems is fraught with uncertainty, as data on uncommon attacks is 
limited, costs are difficult to estimate, and technology and tools are continually changing. Consequently, experts 
may interpret the security risks posed to a system in different ways, leading to variation in assessment. This 
paper presents research into measuring the variability in decision making between security professionals, 
with the ultimate goal of improving the quality of security advice given to software system designers. A set 
of thirty nine cyber-security experts took part in an exercise in which they independently assessed a realistic 
system scenario. This study quantifies agreement in the opinions of experts, examines methods of aggregat-
ing opinions, and produces an assessment of attacks from ratings of their components. The authors show 
that when aggregated, a coherent consensus view of security emerges which can be used to inform decisions 
made during systems design.
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This special issue asks two questions:
1.  What are the foundational, measurable, and 
repeatable scientific elements applicable 
to assuring the cybersecurity of software 
systems?
In the real world, the subjective opinions 
of cybersecurity experts are used to assess the 
security of software systems in their design 
stage. Indeed, this is often the only way to 
make such assessment. However, the human 
elements involved introduce the potential for 
inconsistency both between experts, and within 
the experts themselves. In this paper we show 
how the opinions of experts can be elicited and 
measured, and how we can ameliorate (and 
measure) the effects of their inherent variation 
through aggregation to produce a consistent and 
repeatable assessment.
2.  How should we verify and validate soft-
ware systems in terms that will provide 
indisputable scientific evidence that they 
are secure?
We contend that ‘indisputable evidence’ of 
security is not a practical concept in the real-
world, as no system can be guaranteed to be 
without security risks for any length of time. 
Furthermore, we argue that independent, mea-
sured, ‘proven’ expert opinion should be used to 
verify and validate software systems. Repeated 
successful assessments by cybersecurity experts 
provide the historical scientific evidence that 
their opinions are a valid and proven method 
of assuring the security of software systems. 
The job of security practitioners is to make an 
informed judgement as to whether the system is 
secured to an appropriate degree for the threat 
environment it faces.
The work described in this paper addresses 
two key topics of interest, Measuring Human 
Factors in Security – In the method we present, 
human experts are used to validate software 
systems. Perceptions of security vary both be-
tween experts, and within an individual expert. 
Our method allows us to explicitly measure 
this variation, and produce an assessment that 
accounts for it. Quantitative Security Manage-
ment – The outcome of the proposed method 
is a quantification of expert opinion of the 
security of a system, including a measurement 
of uncertainty. These values can be used to 
make decisions regarding the implementation 
of a software system, and the management of 
its security framework.
In the proposed method we use two dif-
ferent types of survey to elicit the opinions of 
a group of security experts. The first involves 
ranking a series of technical attacks on a system 
in order of how difficult they are to carry out 
undetected by the system or its operators. The 
second requires experts to rate components of 
attacks in terms of aspects which are thought to 
contribute to their overall difficulty. In practice, 
a system is only as secure as its weakest ele-
ment, i.e., the easiest way in. Identifying which 
are the weakest aspects of a system, i.e., the 
‘easiest’ ways of attacking it, is thus a highly 
relevant component of system security assess-
ment, though obviously it does not provide all 
of the answers.
We have applied the method to measure 
variation within a set of thirty nine highly ex-
perienced expert practitioners including system 
and software architects, security consultants, 
penetration testers, vulnerability researchers 
and specialist systems evaluators.
This paper shows how we are able to use 
expert opinion to produce a consistent assess-
ment, and identify outliers. We also discuss the 
meaning of the results, and how the approach 
could be applied in future work.
motivation
Designing and assessing a secure systems ar-
chitecture is an increasingly complex problem 
due to the diversification and expansion of 
technology which has taken place over the last 
few years. For example, in recent years there 
has been a vast expansion in use of shared/
collaborative services, and in the use of virtu-
alisation technologies such as in provision of 
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cloud services. Architectures are more fluid 
and there are few established security models.
Defensive security technologies have also 
become more complex, and in some cases it 
is far from clear what a product actually does 
or how well it does its job. Trends which have 
complicated the picture include the greater use 
of after-the-fact heuristic techniques in products 
such as anti-virus or IDS systems, the greater 
use of isolation techniques such as sandbox-
ing, and complex aggregation and analysis of 
observed data by security vendors.
Threat assessment has also become more 
complex, as sophisticated attack techniques 
have proliferated via toolsets available on the 
Internet, placing sophisticated capability into 
unsophisticated hands. These rapid changes 
make it difficult for experts to make consistent, 
well founded judgements about what secure 
architecture and design practices to adopt.
BAckgRoUnd
While others have examined the aggregation 
of experts’ opinions for security assessment, 
we are not aware of any work that assesses the 
variation in security expert decision making 
with regard to ranking attacks by difficulty, and 
rating how difficult it is to compromise/bypass 
their components. Related work detailing the 
aggregation of experts’ opinions for security as-
sessments will be described, as this task shares 
many similarities with the problem addressed 
by the proposed method.
Tan and Li (2012) propose a combination 
of Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and 
information entropy for representing group deci-
sion making when assessing security risks. AHP 
(Saaty, 1990) is a method of decision making 
that involves breaking problems down into a 
hierarchy of more manageable problems, which 
are then compared to assign a relative weighting 
and assessed individually. Then, a level of risk 
for the overall problem is calculated using the 
individual assessments and weightings. In this 
case experts’ weightings are calculated using 
information entropy, which takes into account 
their professional status and the credibility of 
their submitted opinion. Their opinions are ag-
gregated using a process involving a weighted 
geometric mean that produces an overall opin-
ion. The authors provide an example showing 
how three experts’ opinions of the level of risk 
posed by a set of security threats are combined 
using the proposed method.
A method proposed by Chan (2010) uses 
a Bayesian index to combine experts’ opinions 
of security risk into one information security 
(IS) risk model. Bayesian models provide the 
means to compute the probability of high or 
low information risk based on a set of risk 
indicators. In this study, eleven experts created 
a list of security risk indicators and assigned 
weights to them. The resulting Bayesian model 
was validated with forty one companies, each 
of which completed a survey regarding their IS 
protection measures, and the occurrence of IS 
incidents during the past two years. The results 
show that there was high correlation between 
the companies’ Bayesian indexes and experts’ 
judgements.
Goyette and Karmouch (2011) propose a 
method of assessing the security of virtual net-
works. This is a particularly problematic area of 
information security as service providers do not 
have details of the physical infrastructure over 
which the virtual network operates. A combi-
nation of Dempster-Shafer theory (Dempster, 
1968) and MACBETH (Measuring Attractive-
ness by a Categorical Based Evaluation Tech-
nique) are used to provide the means for experts 
to make asynchronous contributions to an IS 
model. Dempster-Shafer theory is a method 
of combining evidence from multiple sources 
to produce a degree of belief about a question, 
and MACBETH is a decision making tool used 
by a group of experts to rank alternatives that 
depend upon multiple criteria. Experts submit 
their opinions through a series of questions and 
a confidence index in their answers. The experts’ 
opinions are aggregated using Dempster-Shafer 
theory to produce a set of degrees of belief. The 
authors demonstrate the model with a numeri-
cal example involving five experts, where their 
opinions on one value judgement are fused in 
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a way that does not require the experts to be in 
the same physical location, or indeed submit 
their opinions at the same time.
Secure systems design is a problem with 
inherently high levels of uncertainty. For ex-
ample, the potential vulnerabilities of products, 
and how they may evolve over time, must be 
estimated. Potential new attacks, including 
previously unseen categories of attacks must 
also be estimated – and this may be over long 
timescales if considering the service life of the 
system. Fuzzy Logic (Zadeh, 1973) is particu-
larly well suited to tasks of this nature as it allows 
us to model the uncertainty that is present in 
information systems security problems and the 
experts who make decisions regarding them. A 
variety of methods based on fuzzy techniques 
have been applied in areas closely related to 
that being addressed in this paper.
A method of risk analysis that uses similar-
ity measures with fuzzy sets is proposed by Chen 
and Chen (2003). Security risks of a system 
component are rated by looking at the risk of 
failure of each of its sub-components, and the 
severity of losing them. Experts rate each sub-
component using linguistic terms (represented 
by fuzzy sets), and overall risk for a component 
is computed using a weighted average of the 
risks associated with the sub-components. The 
result of the averaging process (a fuzzy set) is 
then compared to nine linguistic terms using 
a similarity measure. The most similar term 
is selected to describe the risk for the compo-
nent. An example shows how multiple experts’ 
opinions along with their degree of confidence 
in their assessments can be used to produce an 
overall risk assessment for a component. The 
method is shown to be a suitable method of ag-
gregating risks associated with sub-components 
by multiple experts to form a group opinion of 
an entire system.
In Garibaldi and Ozen (2007) the authors 
propose the use of ‘nonstationary’ fuzzy reason-
ing to model the variation in expert decision 
making in a medical case study. Nonstationary 
fuzzy systems introduce small variations to 
the model over time, mimicking the temporal 
variation found in the opinions of real-world 
experts. This work builds on work in which a 
standard fuzzy system is used to model medical 
experts’ opinion in the context of umbilical acid 
base analysis, whereby properties of blood taken 
from the umbilical cord after child birth are used 
to determine the health of a new born child. A 
set of rules for the system was created through 
consultation with experts, and the system was 
tuned using the experts’ judgements. Fifty cases 
that were said to be difficult to interpret were 
selected from a database of ten thousand cases, 
and each expert was asked to rank them in order 
from ‘worst’ to ‘best’ in terms of health. The 
standard fuzzy expert system was then used to 
produce scores for each of the fifty cases, al-
lowing a ranking to be produced for comparison 
with the experts’ rankings. The results show 
that the ranking produced by the fuzzy expert 
system was very close to that produced by the 
experts. Following this, the authors show that 
by introducing variation into the model, the 
variation within a single expert over time, and 
between a group of experts, can be modelled 
with an approach that does not produce the 
same answer every time, despite the same input.
Sendi et al. (2010) propose the use of 
FEMRA (Fuzzy Expert Model for Risk Assess-
ment), a system that represents the knowledge of 
experts, and uses a fuzzy rule base to produce a 
numeric value representing risk. A list of assets 
and threats were identified and three experts 
were asked to rate the qualities ‘Confidentiality’, 
‘Integrity’ and ‘Availability’ in the range [0,1]. A 
list of vulnerabilities was then created, and used 
with the list of assets and threats to create a list 
of risks. Asset values, vulnerability effects and 
threat effects were rated by the experts, then the 
fuzzy model took these values and converted 
each of them into one of three fuzzy sets ‘Low’, 
‘Medium’ and ‘High’. A rule base was created 
which allowed the combination of these sets 
to produce an output set determining risk. The 
final output of the system is an index of risk 
value produced by ‘defuzzifying’ the output 
set, that can be used by managers to decide on 
the appropriate action to be taken.
Feng and Li (2010) put forward an Infor-
mation Systems Security (ISS) risk assessment 
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model that uses fuzzy sets to represent the de-
gree of belief for a statement based on current 
evidence. The model is demonstrated using a 
real world case study of a Chinese financial 
service’s information systems. Six experts rated 
the strength of the evidence, in this case com-
ponents/effects of risks, which are represented 
using fuzzy sets. For comparison three other 
approaches were tested: Fuzzy Comprehensive 
Evaluation (FCE), Bayesian Networks (BNs) 
and traditional Dempster-Shafer theory. The 
authors state that their method is an improve-
ment over the other methods tested as it reduces 
the uncertainty inherent in conflicting evidence 
provided by multiple experts.
Wu et al. (2009) demonstrate an improved 
version of AHP based on fuzzy sets to be used 
for risk assessment of information systems. Two 
hierarchies are constructed (as in traditional 
AHP), one representing the probability of an 
incident (a combination of threats and vulner-
abilities), the other representing the impact of 
an incident (a combination of recovery costs and 
severity). Experts are asked to rate the factors 
at the bottom of the hierarchies, their opinions 
are represented using fuzzy sets. These opin-
ions are then combined to complete the AHP, 
producing a risk vector. An example is given in 
which three experts assess the factors identified 
in a hierarchy, and these opinions are combined 
to produce a comprehensive fuzzy judgement 
matrix. The elements of the matrix are then 
weighted and used to produce a risk vector.
Fuzzy sets are used for information security 
risk assessment in research carried out by Fu 
et al. (2008). Three categories (Asset, Threat 
and Survivability (Vulnerability)) are rated 
by experts using nine linguistic variables that 
quantify the risk (e.g., ‘very little’ loss or ‘very 
high’ threat), the experts’ opinions are then 
aggregated using the Delphi method (Linstone 
& Turoff, 1975). The Delphi method involves 
gathering experts’ opinions in a number of 
rounds. After each round, an anonymous sum-
mary of the experts’ opinions and reasoning is 
shown, and the experts are asked again for their 
opinion. The idea is that experts may revise their 
opinions in light of their colleagues’ opinions 
and reasoning. The technique stops when a 
pre-defined criteria is met (e.g., number of 
rounds, consensus reached). An overall fuzzy 
number is produced using all of the categories 
of risk, which is then defuzzified to produce a 
risk index. An example shows how the method 
works, in which the opinions of three experts 
are used to calculate a description of risk for a 
synthetic system.
metHodologY
A key part of this research is the elicitation of 
opinions from a group of cybersecurity experts 
about how difficult it is to complete attacks and 
compromise/bypass components for a given 
system design. The opinions are then used to 
produce a consistent measurement.
Our partnership with CESG gives us a level 
of access to such experts that would be difficult 
to attain otherwise. As the National Technical 
Authority for Information Security in the UK, 
CESG has access to a cadre of specialist security 
architects and other technical security experts, 
and can draw on both public and private sector 
expertise.
The methodology was tested in scenarios 
involving expert analysis of factors relating to 
attacking a system’s architecture. Three knowl-
edge extraction exercises were performed. The 
following sections describe the initial exercise, 
a follow up prototype exercise and the main 
exercise, respectively.
Initial exercise
The purpose of the initial exercise was to 
develop a scenario consisting of a system to-
gether with various methods / vulnerabilities 
/ attacks, realistic enough to permit reasoned 
assessment, while being difficult to assess 
fully, even by leading experts. A scenario was 
created by a senior member of CESG technical 
staff that is designed to be representative of 
a fairly mainstream government system. The 
system involves a range of core services and 
back end office facilities together with remote 
sites and mobile access. Core systems hold 
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the most sensitive business information, with 
assets rated in terms of their value at Business 
Impact Level 3 (BIL3) following the standard 
UK government scheme (CESG, 2009). This 
scale rates the impact of an event from BIL0 
(no consequences) to BIL6 (catastrophic).
Six technical experts from CESG were 
presented with the scenario, the creator of the 
scenario described the system in detail, show-
ing diagrams of various aspects of the system, 
and answering experts’ questions. The group 
then carried out a mock security review of the 
architecture, a task highly familiar to them. As a 
group they were then challenged to identify ten 
different ways of mounting an end-to-end attack 
on the system, identifying all individual attack 
elements involved. The end to end attacks are 
termed ‘attack vectors’ (AVs), and individual 
elements are termed ‘hops’. Once a set of ten AVs 
had been established, the experts were asked 
to rank them from one to ten in order of how 
difficult each was to carry out undetected. This 
was done without the experts communicating 
with one another to ensure that each individual 
gave their opinion without outside influence. 
Even with the experts’ in-depth knowledge of 
information security this was a task with a fair 
degree of uncertainty, as much of the detail re-
quired to precisely assess difficulty was absent. 
For example, no information was provided about 
the exact software and hardware being used in 
the proposed system. Participants were asked to 
assume that it was of the typical standard that 
would be used in a government system of this 
type. All of the experts involved in the exercise 
regularly work with UK government BIL3 sys-
tems, and so are aware of associated security 
policy and how it is typically applied to such 
systems in terms of component configuration, 
frequency of anti-virus updates, etc. Having 
ranked the ten AVs, the technical experts were 
then asked to rate each of the hops by difficulty 
(either ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’), and rate their 
confidence in their answer (as ‘low’, ‘medium’ 
or ‘high’), again, this was conducted in isolation. 
The confidence rating was provided to allow 
the experts to show uncertainty in their answer, 
whether it is caused by a lack of clarity in the 
scenario/hop description, a lack of knowledge 
of a particular technology (e.g., cryptography), 
or other sources of uncertainty.
data Analysis
Having collected the data, analysis was per-
formed to examine the variation in opinion 
within the group. This section contains the out-
come of the data analysis activity for this initial 
exercise. In Table 1, each expert is compared 
to the group response produced by taking the 
average ranking of each AV and sorting them 
into ascending order. The difference column 
shows the distance between each expert’s rank-
ing and the group rank, and Spearman’s rho is 
used to compare each expert’s rank order with 
the group rank order. Finally, Kendall’s W is 
used to compute the rank correlation within 
the group of all six experts. Spearman’s rho 
measures the statistical dependence of two sets 
of rankings, correlation is measured on a scale 
from -1 (perfect negative correlation), through 0 
(no correlation), to +1 (perfect positive correla-
tion). Kendall’s W is a similar measure used to 
calculate the agreement between rankings from 
a group of people, producing values from 0 (no 
agreement) to 1 (complete agreement). These 
correlation measures are particularly useful in 
cases like the one described here, where we 
Table 1. Initial exercise AV ranking 
A B C D E F
Difference 8 14 18 10 6 4
Spearman’s	Rho 0.90 0.78 0.77 0.92 0.94 0.96
Kendall’s	W 0.82
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are working with a set of subjective rankings, 
produced by humans.
The results show that there is a clear 
positive correlation between the individual 
rankings and the group rank, and that there is 
a strong correlation between the individuals 
themselves. In order to determine whether the 
averaging processes involved would always 
result in a high level of correlation, a random 
set of rankings was produced. For comparison, 
Table 2 shows the result of the same process 
using random rankings, which show that the 
correlation is significantly worse than that 
produced by the experts.
Figure 1 shows the agreement within the 
group, the x-axis represents the average ranking 
for the set of all 6 experts, and each of the cor-
responding experts’ ranks are shown on the 
y-axis. The height of the columns denotes how 
many experts assigned a particular ranking to 
an AV. Again, for comparison, Figure 2 shows 
the result of a group of random rankings.
The results of this initial exercise show 
that while this group of experts may have dif-
ferent areas of expertise, and the scenario 
contains omissions and uncertainties, the rank-
ings produced by the experts have a high degree 
of correlation, suggesting that there is a con-
sensus about which AVs are more difficult than 
others. The comparison with random rankings 
shows that this level of agreement is not an 
artefact of the averaging process. These findings 
were taken into consideration when creating 
the main exercise which includes a larger and 
more disparate group of experts, the aim being 
to explore how decision making varies within 
and between groups of individuals from differ-
ent parts of the cyber-security community.
PRototYPe eXeRcISe
Although the previous study shows that using 
the experts’ AV rankings we can demonstrate 
that there is a consensus of opinion, when it 
comes to the hop data we are unable to perform 
a detailed analysis. This is because for each hop, 
experts have only three possible answers, mak-
ing any analysis lack the level of detail required 
to produce a meaningful result.
To address this, a novel approach to captur-
ing expert opinion and expressing subjective 
uncertainty was devised that allows participants 
to make a more detailed differentiation between 
hops’ difficulties and their certainty. There are 
a number of reasons that an expert could be 
uncertain in their answer, including:
1.  The individual is not familiar with a par-
ticular technology.
2.  The inherent uncertainty caused by insuf-
ficient detail in the scenario (e.g., precise 
component and frequency of patching not 
specified; in some cases this will make 
little difference while in others it could be 
significant).
3.  The individual’s personality (e.g., they 
may be naturally cautious about making a 
precise prediction).
Experts gave their answers as an interval, 
on a scale of 0 to 100. This was done by drawing 
an ellipse as shown in Figure 3, which shows an 
example question with two possible answers, 
one more uncertain than the other. The interval 
is produced using the points where the ellipse 
intersects the scale. The width of the interval 
denotes the uncertainty the expert has in their 
answer, the wider the interval, the less certain 
Table 2. Random AV ranking 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
Difference 24 16 30 20 42 26
Spearman’s	Rho 0.25 0.75 0.30 0.61 -0.15 0.25
Kendall’s	W 0.12
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Figure 2. Group agreement random
Figure 1. Group agreement initial exercise
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the expert is. Using this refined method, partici-
pants are able to impart much more information 
about their uncertainty than was possible in the 
initial exercise.
As a trial for the new method of eliciting 
expert knowledge, an exercise was carried out 
with PhD students and researchers from the 
Intelligent Modelling and Analysis research 
group at the University of Nottingham. Par-
ticipants were asked to rate aspects of a series 
of restaurants in the Nottingham city centre 
area. For example, questions included ‘How 
polite are the staff?’ and ‘Overall, how would 
you rate this eating place?’. Ratings were de-
scribed using the proposed method of drawing 
ellipses (Miller, 2012).
The overall response to the use of ellipses 
was a positive one. The participants liked the 
use of a single pen-stroke to determine their 
answer and their uncertainty.
mAIn eXeRcISe
A set of thirty nine security professionals from 
seven groups took part in the main exercise, 
drawn from a mixture of government and com-
mercial backgrounds. The groups included sys-
tem and software architects, technical security 
consultants, penetration testers, vulnerability 
researchers and specialist systems evaluators. 
All participants have a high level of expertise, 
with both breadth and depth of experience.
The reason for using a larger set of experts 
from multiple groups is to allow examination of 
the variation and agreement within each group, 
and between groups to see if different specialist 
fields of cyber-security differ in their variation 
and agreement, and how each field varies in its 
agreement with other groups.
data Acquisition
Following the prototype exercise, the main ex-
ercise was undertaken using the same method of 
eliciting expert opinion. The scenario, AVs and 
hops from the initial exercise were revisited and 
refined in order to provide a clearer definition 
for the participating experts. The experts were 
given a presentation by the scenario creator with 
details and diagrams of the updated scenario, 
AVs (see Figure 4) and hops, and had the op-
portunity to ask questions about the system. As 
in the initial exercise the experts were asked 
to assume that the software/hardware and fre-
quency of patching was of the typical standard 
that they came across in their work with this 
type of government system. They all regularly 
work with UK government BIL3 systems, and 
so are aware of associated security policy and 
how it is typically applied to such systems in 
terms of component configuration, frequency 
of anti-virus updates, etc.
To illustrate the exercise, a diagram of one 
of the AVs and its constituent hops is reproduced 
in Figure 4. The diagram shows the system, 
hops and path an attacker would take to complete 
this attack vector. The experts were presented 
with this type of diagram for each of the ten 
attack vectors. This AV is called ‘Malformed 
Figure 3. Interval response where (a) is a less uncertain response and (b) is a more uncertain 
response
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document via email’, and entails an attacker on 
the Internet sending an email to a system user 
which contains a malformed PDF document. 
The malformed document contains a malicious 
exploit that compromises the desktop client and 
establishes a presence there in order to mount 
an ongoing attack. In addition to crafting the 
malware, the attacker must also evade detection 
by the relevant gateway defences, and must 
overcome the lockdown applied to the client. 
There are five distinct hops for this AV:
1.  Bypass gateway content checker (i.e., evade 
detection)
2.  Bypass gateway anti-virus
3.  Compromise PDF renderer
4.  Bypass anti-virus on client
5.  Overcome client lockdown (i.e., access 
controls on the client)
Note that there is not a hop to bypass the 
gateway firewall in this attack because the ex-
ploit is carried within legitimate business traffic 
(i.e., an email), hence no work is required to 
pass through the firewall.
The ten AVs that were presented to the 
experts are as follows:
• Malformed document via email (see 
Figure 4)
• Compromise central cryptographic device
• Attack via VOIP client
• Attack via network management tools
• Steal credentials and upload malicious 
document
• Attack via enterprise services
• Entice user to malicious website
• Subvert SAN via virtualisation infrastructure
• Instant Messaging client
• Malicious SQL attack
Note that these are shown in random order; 
this is because detail of how specific AVs were 
ranked has not been released as part of this da-
taset. The first part of the exercise consisted of 
the experts ranking the ten AVs in order of how 
Figure 4. Example attack - ‘malformed document via email’
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difficult they thought it would be to carry out 
the attack without being detected. This activity 
was conducted in examination-like conditions 
to ensure that there were no outside influences 
on the experts’ opinions.
Following this, the second part of the 
exercise required experts to answer a series of 
questions about each of the hops making up the 
AVs, giving their answers using an ellipse as 
in the prototype exercise. The questions were 
devised in collaboration with CESG’s technical 
experts to determine what the important factors 
are that contribute to the difficulty of hops and 
AVs. The resulting questions included (but were 
not limited to):
1.  How mature is this type of technology? 
(i.e., the component’s technology)
2.  How likely is it that there would be a pub-
licly available tool that could help with this 
attack?
3.  How much does the target component 
process/interact with any of its data inputs?
4.  How complex is the target component 
(e.g. in terms of size of code, number of 
sub-components)?
The experts were divided up, completing 
the hop questions in a number of separate rooms 
in exam conditions. As there were thirty nine 
participants and twenty six distinct hops in the 
scenario, with up to eight questions per hop, 
this produced a substantial dataset of around six 
thousand observations. We believe this scope 
of data collection and quantity of data collected 
from highly experienced security practitioners 
to be unprecedented. This larger number of 
participants and groups allows us to look at the 
variation between the individuals within groups, 
between groups, and in the overall opinions of 
the set of thirty nine experts.
data Analysis: AVs
In the first stage of analysis, work focused on 
the AV rankings, assessing the level of variation 
that occurred between individual experts, and 
groups of experts. Initially, individual experts’ 
opinions were studied. Figure 5 shows how the 
set of thirty nine experts ranked one of the AVs, 
AV1. Each point on the x-axis represents one 
of the thirty nine experts, and the y-axis is used 
to show how they ranked AV1.
Two things are apparent from Figure 5:
1.  There is a general consensus that AV1 is 
easy compared to the other AVs (1: Easiest, 
10: Hardest). It can be seen that the majority 
of participants have given a higher (easier) 
ranking to AV1.
2.  There is a very broad spectrum of opinions. 
There is at least one individual in the set 
that has given each of the complete range 
of rankings 1 – 10.
The other nine AV rankings show a similar 
level of variation to the one shown in Figure 5, 
with nine of them being ranked in at least eight 
of the ten possible places. This tells us that while 
there is agreement within the set, if we were 
to ask one single expert for their ranking for 
AV1, we might get any one of the ten possible 
rankings. From a security advisory perspective 
this is obviously undesirable, as our aim is to 
provide clear and consistent advice. However, as 
we will see, by aggregating the experts’ opinions 
we can produce a more consistent response.
At group level there is a range of levels of 
agreement, some of the seven groups are more 
consistent than others. Table 3 details the mean 
Spearman’s rho for individuals of each group 
(compared against the group average) and the 
Kendall’s W for each group. It can be seen that 
Group D has the best agreement, and Group G 
has the least agreement among its members.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show agreement 
among the individuals of Group D and Group 
G respectively. As in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the 
x-axis represents the group average ranking, 
and the y-axis is used to show how each expert 
ranked each of the AVs from the group ranking. 
The height of the columns denotes how many 
experts assigned each ranking to an AV. In these 
two cases there are ties in the rankings, mean-
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ing that not all of the group ranks are integer 
values. Obviously, as each individual has a 
contribution to the group mean we would expect 
to see some agreement, but it is clear that Group 
D are more consistent than Group G in their 
decision making.
The next step in the analysis was to look 
at the entire set of thirty nine experts. Table 4 
provides the Spearman’s rho for each indi-
vidual’s ranking compared with the set’s mean 
ranking. The majority of the set have a strong 
correlation with the overall consensus opinion, 
and five individuals have a particularly weak 
correlation with the group. By identifying 
outliers, we provide the opportunity to inves-
tigate further to see why these individuals 
disagree with the group, and whether further 
action is required e.g., further training, or dis-
semination of new knowledge.
Table 5 and Figure 8 show each group 
compared with the overall set of thirty nine 
experts’ mean ranking. In Figure 8 the x-axis 
shows the AVs in order of average rank, and 
the y-axis shows how the experts ranked each 
AV. It can be seen that although at individual 
level there is some disagreement, when the 
opinions of each group are aggregated there is 
a very strong consensus of opinion providing 
a consistent measure of AV difficulty.
Following this, scatter plots were produced 
to illustrate how the individuals within each 
group related to one another, and how the groups 
related to each other. Two distances were used 
for the plot, distance from the set mean ranking, 
and distance from the scenario creator’s rank-
ing. The scenario creator is the most senior 
member of the internal technical teams, and as 
the creator we can assume that he has the clear-
est understanding of the scenario. Because of 
Figure 5. Spread of rankings for AV1
Table 3. Group agreement 
Group A B C D E F G
Mean	Spearman’s 0.82 0.76 0.83 0.92 0.61 0.66 0.56
Kendall’s	W 0.69 0.59 0.72 0.88 0.39 0.47 0.33
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Figure 6. Group D agreement
Figure 7. Group G agreement
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this, his ranking can be used as a reference 
against which to rate others’ responses (although 
this is not necessarily considered as ‘correct’). 
Figure 9 contains the resulting scatter plot.
As we might expect some of the groups 
appear to be more disparate than others. For 
example Group D is closely grouped, while 
Group G is spread out more widely, as re-
flected by the intra-group agreements shown 
in Figure 6 and Figure 7. There may be many 
reasons for this, and it is not necessarily the 
case that Group G is inferior to Group D. For 
example, it may be that Group D are experts 
who work together regularly in the same office, 
and Group G could be individuals who work 
in different parts of the country and have 
never met, and therefore have very different 
experiences. However, full details of the group-
ings are restricted, and as such were not released 
as part of this data set, preventing a full ex-
amination of the reasons for disparity.
data Analysis: Hops
The second stage of analysis involves examin-
ing the data collected regarding the individual 
hops, and potentially relating these to the AVs. 
As stated previously, the hop rating part of the 
exercise required experts to answer a series of 
questions about the twenty six hops that make 
up the ten AVs that were ranked in the previous 
part of the exercise. The result of the exercise 
was a collection of intervals that describe each 
expert’s opinion of a particular aspect of a 
particular hop.
For our initial hop analysis, we have fo-
cused on one question ‘Overall, how difficult 
would it be for an attacker to [successfully make 
the hop]?’ This question was designed to elicit 
one overall difficulty rating for the hop, while 
the other questions focus on specific aspects 
of that difficulty. This initial hop analysis is 
restricted to Group D, as they were the most 
consistent in the AV ranking part of the exercise.
Table 4. Individuals vs. overall group 
Group A B C D E F G
Expert
.a 0.9152 0.6848 0.7212 0.9152 0.2121 0.9394 0.9273
.b 0.7091 0.7212 0.8182 0.9152 0.7576 0.0545 0.6727
.c 0.8303 0.5879 0.8667 0.9273 -0.0182 0.8424 -0.1636
.d 0.7697 0.7333 0.8545 0.7818 0.8545 0.7939 0.4788
.e 0.2848 0.6848 0.8667 0.8788 0.7697 0.7818
.f 0.6606 0.7212 0.3212
.g 0.9636
.h 0.4909
Denotes particularly strong correlation 
with the group (Rho>0.7)
Denotes particularly weak correlation 
with the group (Rho<0.3)
Table 5. Groups compared with set mean ranking 
Group A B C D E F G
Rho 0.891 0.912 0.927 0.948 0.827 0.954 0.948
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Each of the twenty six hops belongs to one 
or more of the ten AVs, Table 6 shows which 
hops belong to each AV.
Using this information, the ratings an expert 
gave for each hop can be used to compute a 
difficulty value for each AV. This has been done 
using a number of methods of aggregation:
1.  Sum
2.  Minimum
3.  Mean
4.  Maximum
5.  Ordered Weighted Average
Each of these methods has been applied 
to the minimum, mean and maximum of the 
hop intervals for each AV. For example, Table 
7 shows Expert D.b’s responses to the ‘Overall’ 
question for each of the hops in AV1 (2,3,1,4,5).
Any of the aggregation operators above 
can be applied to these data to compute a dif-
ficulty score for AV1, e.g., mean of mean 
values (39.1), sum of maximum values (250) 
or minimum of minimum values (10). This 
process can then be repeated for each method 
for all ten AVs to produce scores for each 
method and a value for each AV. The difficulty 
scores are then used to rank the AVs, the rank-
ing produced by each method is compared to 
the actual ranking given by the expert in the 
previous exercise. By doing this, the relation-
ship between an expert’s AV ranking and their 
hop ratings can be examined.
Discussions with a smaller group of CESG 
experts had generated a hypothesis that the dif-
ficulty of a given AV may be determined largely 
by the maximum difficulty of its constituent 
hops. However, it became apparent that the 
use of the maximum or minimum operators 
in particular produced a lot of equal scores 
for AVs, making the resulting AV ranking less 
meaningful. To help overcome this difficulty 
Figure 8. All groups – inter-group comparison
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Figure 9. Scatter plot showing individuals’ distance from group and scenario creator
Table 6. AVs with constituent hops 
AV Hops
1 2,3,1,4,5
2 6,7,6,8,4
3 9
4 10,11,4,5
5 12,13,2,3,14,15,4,5
6 16,16,17,4,5
7 6,18,4,5
8 19,20,21
9 22,23,24
10 25,26,1,4,5
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an Ordered Weighted Average (OWA) (Yager, 
1988) operator was selected as one of the 
aggregation methods. An OWA allows more 
weight to be given to the most difficult hops, 
while still taking into account the other hops 
when rating an AV. This results in a significant 
reduction in the number of ties obtained, leading 
to more meaningful rankings.
An OWA consists of a set of weights (that 
add up to 1), and a set of objects. In our case 
the objects are hop ratings. The first step of the 
OWA is to sort the objects (hop ratings) into 
descending order, so the most difficult hop will 
be placed at the start of the list. Then, each of 
the weights is multiplied by the correspond-
ing object, so the first weight is multiplied by 
the first object and so on. If the first weight is 
high (near to one), then the resultant operator 
is close to a maximum. This weighting will 
then be reflected in the overall score produced 
for an AV. A selection of OWA operators were 
used that gave precedence to hops with higher 
difficulty ratings.
As an added complexity, each AV has a 
different number of hops, so fixed weights 
cannot be used with the OWA. Two alter-
native weighting strategies were used for 
the experiment, referred to as OWA(1) and 
OWA(2). Both use a form of ranking propor-
tionate weighting, OWA (1) features a steady 
decrease of weightings, for example an AV 
with five hops is given a linearly decreasing 
weighting {5/15,4/15,3/15,2/15,1/15}. OWA 
(2) features a much sharper decrease in weights 
after the most difficult hop, for example an 
AV with five hops uses weights in proportion 
{1/2,1/4,1/8,1/16,1/32}, with the weights nor-
malised to ensure that they sum to one.
Each aggregation operator was applied to 
the hop rankings given by each of the members 
of Group D. Then, for each method, the ranking 
produced was compared with the actual ranking 
given by the individual expert. Table 8 gives 
a summary of the best results found using the 
aggregation operators. The figures shown are 
Spearman’s rho for the comparison between the 
rank derived from the hop data using each of 
the aggregation methods, and the actual rank 
provided by that individual.
The Spearman’s rho figures show that there 
is a very high level of correlation between the 
rankings that the experts provided in the first 
part of the exercise, and those derived from 
their hop ratings. That is, by combining an 
individual’s hop ratings it is possible to produce 
AV rankings that are closely correlated to that 
Table 7. Expert D.b’s ‘overall’ intervals for AV1 
Hop Min Mean Max
1 10 25 40
2 30 40 50
3 11 20.5 30
4 30 40 50
5 60 70 80
Table 8. Summary of hop aggregation results 
Expert D.a D.b D.c D.d Mean
Mean	Mean 0.758 0.879 0.830 0.879 0.836
OWA	Mean	(1) 0.830 0.879 0.867 0.879 0.864
OWA	Mean	(2) 0.830 0.855 0.891 0.879 0.864
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same individual’s AV rankings. The benefit of 
using OWA operators that give more weight 
the most difficult hops can be seen, as they 
avoid the tied rankings produced when using a 
maximum operator.
dIScUSSIon
In the methodology presented in this paper, the 
subjective opinions of cybersecurity profession-
als are used to create a consistent validation of 
proposed software systems. As well as providing 
a metric of security, it also allows systematic 
identification of:
1.  Topics where there is a clearly established 
consensus of opinion.
2.  Topics where there is significant disagree-
ment between experts.
3.  Individuals within the community who are 
consistently making judgements which are 
strongly away from the norm.
Note that the consensus opinion is not 
necessarily presented as the ‘ground truth’; 
however, if the level of expertise is high and 
the degree of agreement is strong then it is more 
likely to hold true. In the real world, the use of 
measured expert opinion is often the only way 
of achieving a practical, realistic assessment. We 
also emphasise that individuals who are making 
‘outlier decisions’ should not be considered as 
‘wrong’. In fact, in some cases they may repre-
sent people at the forefront of new knowledge 
creation. In these cases the individuals have an 
important role to play in challenging the ‘group 
think’. However, in other cases, ‘outliers’ may 
simply be less experienced or skilled than the 
norm. If this is the case, then these individuals 
could be considered for targeted training. The 
identification of, and subsequent interaction 
with ‘outliers’ therefore needs to be carefully 
managed.
In this research we have used the expertise 
of cybersecurity experts to determine a set of 
AVs to work with, we suggest this is the most 
practical method, as identifying meaningful 
AVs automatically is currently a very difficult 
task for computers to undertake. We’ve used 
what the experts believe to be the ten most 
salient AVs, though the optimal number to use 
will undoubtedly vary from system to system 
dependent upon its complexity. A system is only 
as secure as its weakest element, so identifying 
which are the weakest aspects of a system can 
form an important component of system secu-
rity assessment, though obviously it is not the 
complete solution. Further experimentation is 
required to ascertain the most suitable number 
of AVs to use for a particular system.
While only an initial study, the analysis 
of the hop data has produced some interesting 
results. Using a limited set of data, it has been 
demonstrated that we are able to aggregate hop 
ratings for an individual to produce a measure 
of security for an AV. The rankings produced 
using these measures are closely correlated with 
the experts’ actual AV rankings. From this we 
can gather that for these experts, their answer to 
the ‘Overall’ question for each hop is strongly 
related to how they rank AVs containing this 
hop. While this may seem obvious, it is by no 
means guaranteed a priori, due to the fact that 
the AV ranking and hop analysis were carried 
out at different times of the day, and the map-
ping of hops to AVs is non-obvious.
If this is the case for all of our experts, it 
suggests that ratings of hops can be used to rank 
AVs in order of difficulty. In the future, it may be 
possible to build a database of hop ratings that 
can be used to rank AVs in proposed systems, 
highlighting those that present greater risk.
Possible applications of the work presented 
in this paper include:
1.  A validation tool, providing guidance on the 
difficulty of AVs for a proposed software 
system, based upon experts’ knowledge of 
both hops and AVs. This would be very use-
ful when designing information systems, 
as it could provide validation of security 
for given parts of a proposed system.
2.  A methodology for establishing a consensus 
opinion of multiple experts. The aggrega-
tion process has been shown to reduce 
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the effects of outliers, producing a more 
consistent measure of security.
3.  A system for identifying outlying experts 
who may have cutting edge knowledge, or 
require support and training. In either case, 
the ability to identify outlying experts is 
critical to our goal of providing clear and 
consistent advice to system designers.
conclUSIon And 
FUtURe woRk
In this paper we show how expert opinion of 
security can be elicited, measured and aggre-
gated to produce an assessment for a proposed 
software system. The inherent variation that oc-
curs with human experts is reduced, producing 
a consistent outcome. We present analysis and 
results of an exercise involving a set of thirty 
nine security professionals from seven groups 
including government and commercial groups, 
who were given a scenario created by CESG 
security professionals and asked to provide their 
opinions on ten AVs, and the twenty six hops 
that made up the AVs. We believe that a study 
of this scope and scale with highly experienced 
security practitioners to be unique. The analysis 
of the AV data showed that at individual level 
there was variation between individual experts. 
However, further analysis showed that by 
aggregating rankings we are able to produce 
rankings that are more consistent, indicating 
that there is overall consensus.
The initial analysis performed on hop 
data produced results that demonstrate how 
an individual’s hop rankings can be used to 
produce a measure of security for an AV, and 
that the resulting rankings are highly correlated 
with individuals’ actual AV rankings. This 
result tells us that there is a clear relationship 
between the difficulty of AVs and the difficulty 
of constituent hops.
Future lines of research are to include fur-
ther study of the data collected during the hop 
rating exercise. Specifically, this will include 
widening the scope of the initial analysis to 
include all experts to determine whether the 
results of this study hold for less consistent 
groups. We will also explore the answers to the 
remaining questions asked about each hop in 
relation to the ‘Overall’ question, and the AV 
rankings. Other areas of interest with regard to 
the hop data include analysis of the uncertain-
ties expressed by the experts, and determining 
consistencies between experts. More generally, 
real-world applications of the work will be con-
sidered, including providing security validation 
for system designers, establishing a consensus 
among experts, and identifying outliers.
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